Information warfare is often understood as the dissemination of falsehoods intended to portray an adversary as weak, wrong, or wicked. But some of the most consequential information contests today are not simply over facts; they are battles over interpretation. Who started the crisis? Who won the battle? What is the Chinese translation of an agreed English word? Winning that contest can generate tangible strategic returns.
When President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on Sept. 24, the United States and China agreed to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and “reciprocity,” according to a White House fact sheet.
Beijing used the exact same language in its English statement. Yet, in the Chinese version, “reciprocity” was translated as “对等” (duideng), which leans more to “equal in status” or “on an equal footing.”
Foreign Minister Wang Yi then explained precisely what China understood it to mean: the two countries are equal in sovereignty, neither stands above the other, neither should engage in hegemonic or bullying behavior, and each side’s concerns should be addressed on an equal basis, he said.
Trump says “reciprocity” is one of his favorite words, along with “tariff.” To him, it is about enforcing a mechanism to stop other countries “ripping off” the U.S. It is a strict rule of an eye for an eye. Clearly, he does not mean “equal in sovereignty.”
Japan has experienced similar Chinese narrative control. The dispute between Japan and China over Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 2025 comments about Japan’s role in a Taiwan contingency shows how narrative control can migrate into great-power diplomacy, shaping not only perceptions of an event but also the diplomatic response to it.
During the parliamentary session, Takaichi did not announce a new policy or say that Japan would defend Taiwan. China nevertheless portrayed the remarks as a major break with the status quo. Weeks later, after Xi spoke by telephone with Trump, the American president called Takaichi and reportedly advised her not to provoke Beijing over Taiwan.
Beijing’s advantage was the diplomatic sequence: Xi reached Trump first, helping to turn a legalistic parliamentary answer into an international debate over Japanese military intervention.
A second case shows how perceptions can lead to tangible commercial advantage.
During the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan claimed its Chinese-built J-10Cs had downed several Indian aircraft, including French Rafales. Amid unverified and exaggerated accounts of military success from both sides, Pakistan’s claim gained credibility from photographs taken by Indian villagers and from outside analysis linking the wreckage to an Indian Rafale.
The emerging narrative was extraordinarily powerful: a Chinese fighter had prevailed in combat against one of the West’s most prestigious aircraft. The market reacted. Shares of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft, the manufacturer of the J-10, rose roughly 60% in the first week.
The claim gained force because its most persuasive evidence came from outside Pakistan. Photographs of wreckage were taken by Indian civilians, not Pakistani officials, and outside analysts subsequently examined the evidence.
In the weeks after the conflict, Chinese embassies across the world hailed the performance of Chinese weapons in the India-Pakistan clash to bolster arms sales. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission later reported that Pakistan’s reported use of Chinese weapons against India’s French-made Rafales became a particular selling point in Chinese defense sales efforts.
The international commercial interest was clear. Within a month, Indonesia was reportedly considering acquiring Chinese J-10Cs — despite having signed an $8.1 billion deal just three years earlier for 42 French Rafales. By October, Indonesia announced plans to acquire 42 J-10Cs in a deal valued at more than $9 billion.
In August, Azerbaijan sued CNN.
At issue was a report alleging that Israel had sent troops to Azerbaijan and launched attacks on neighboring Iran from Azerbaijani territory — an allegation Azerbaijani officials had denied on the record.
The most revealing part of Azerbaijan’s complaint was not simply its assertion that CNN got the story wrong. It was what Baku said happened next.
In a defamation complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, Baku argued that “precisely because of CNN’s reputation as a reliable news source,” the report “gave Iran a valuable instrument” to reinforce a longstanding narrative “that Azerbaijan serves as a platform for Israeli military and intelligence operations against the Islamic Republic.”
The complaint cited Iranian state and semi-state outlets, including Mashregh News, Tabnak, and the Iranian Labor News Agency, that subsequently ran Farsi-language articles for domestic audiences that accused Azerbaijan of “becoming a secret partner in Israeli operations against Iran.”
Azerbaijan’s predicament illustrates why geopolitical swing states may be particularly vulnerable to such exploitation. The unique qualities that enable Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy — its relationships with the U.S. and Israel and its position between Russia and Iran — also make it vulnerable to actors seeking to constrain its freedom of maneuver.
Its foreign policy depends not only on what Baku does, but on what other capitals believe Baku is doing. Portraying Azerbaijan as an Israeli forward operating base against Iran therefore strikes directly at its balancing strategy. If Tehran comes to believe that Azerbaijani territory is being used for attacks against it, Baku’s freedom to maintain close relations with both Israel and Tehran shrinks — regardless of whether Azerbaijan’s underlying policy has changed.
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Across the three cases, the asset being exploited differed. Beijing perhaps exploited the Trump administration’s lack of focus on the Chinese translation. Pakistan and China benefited from evidence emerging independently from Indian territory. Iran benefited from the institutional credibility of an American news organization.
Information power is not simply the ability to make people believe something false. It is the ability to shape what events mean — and thereby influence what governments, markets, and militaries do next. In the new contest for narrative power, the most valuable information may be information you did not create, from sources you do not control, whose credibility you can nevertheless exploit.
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, where he focuses on Greater Asia — the Eurasian landmass stretching from Turkey to Japan. He previously served as foreign correspondent for the Japanese newspaper Nikkei, with postings in Washington, Cairo, Beijing, Dalian, and New York.
Hamza Azhar Salam is a 2026 journalist-in-residence at the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago. He is the co-founder of the Pakistan Daily and Migrant News and has worked as a reporter for Pakistan’s The News International.
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[ H/T Washington Examiner ]
