U.S. Navy sailors prepare aircraft for nighttime flight operations over the U.S. Central Command operating area in April 2026. (U.S. CENTCOM photo)
After the ceasefire agreement was signed, the evidence indicated that the United States had no clear reason to resume the war. Washington had even adjusted some of its previous positions, focusing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program without making the same demand for an end to its missile program. The United States had also accepted the Islamic Republic’s proposal to extend the ceasefire to Lebanon. With congressional midterm elections approaching, the administration was naturally reluctant to enter another costly and unpredictable war.
At first glance, the Islamic Republic likewise had nothing to gain from continuing the war. Several of its commanders and senior officials had been killed, important infrastructure had been damaged and the country’s economy was moving more rapidly toward collapse. Millions more people had fallen below the poverty line, while continued fighting could turn the economic and social crisis into a new popular anti-regime uprising.
So why did the war begin again?
The answer becomes clear when we distinguish between Iran’s interests and the survival interests of the Islamic Republic. War is devastating for the country and its people. But from the perspective of a failing ruling establishment, peace can be more dangerous for the regime than war.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi effectively acknowledged this in an interview with a documentary filmmaker affiliated with the intelligence services. Asked why the Islamic Republic had not accepted a multiyear suspension of uranium enrichment, allowing it to resume enrichment after a change of administration in Washington, he replied: “If we had accepted, we would have suffered more damage than war.”
Iran Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
He then defined defeat not as the destruction of facilities and infrastructure, but as surrender to American demands. “Because war has costs and risks, we do not fight – unless the cost of not fighting is greater than the cost of fighting,” he said. “If you reach a point where not fighting costs more than fighting, you should not hesitate to fight.”
These words are key to understanding the Islamic Republic’s decision. From the perspective of the ruling faction, implementing the memorandum and entering a period of peace would have been more costly than continuing the war. Peace would have exposed the government to crises that it could no longer justify or conceal through external threats.
The first threat is a crisis at the top. Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father Ali Khamenei after the latter was killed in the Feb. 28 U.S.-Israeli strikes, publicly acknowledged that he had held a different view of the memorandum before authorizing it. His statement revealed both his reservations and his dependence on other power centers. Unlike his father, he has not yet built the personal authority needed to arbitrate between the Revolutionary Guard, clerical institutions, intelligence services and rival political factions. Permanent external confrontation helps him demand obedience before that authority exists.
The second danger is Iranian society itself. The grievances that produced the December-January uprising – economic collapse, repression, corruption and the absence of political freedom – have not disappeared. During wartime, the regime can flood the streets with security forces, restrict communications, brand opponents as enemy agents and accelerate executions under the cover of national emergency. Peace would strip away that justification and return public attention to the government’s failures.
The third is leverage. Iran’s nuclear facilities and military command structure have been badly damaged. By threatening commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran can still raise global energy prices and force other countries to seek an accommodation. The regime is turning an international waterway into both a bargaining chip and a shield for its internal weakness.
Washington should not confuse this strategy with strength. Nor should it give Tehran the endless war its hard-liners need. The United States must protect freedom of navigation and impose consequences for attacks on commercial vessels. Destroying civilian facilities could deepen Iranian suffering while allowing the regime to wrap itself in the flag and intensify repression.
The pressure Tehran fears most is not another bombing campaign. It is the convergence of mass public discontent with organized resistance inside Iran. That is why the regime relentlessly persecutes dissidents, especially supporters of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its Resistance Units.
President Trump should therefore pair deterrence abroad with pressure on the machinery of repression at home: Demand a halt to executions, sanction officials responsible for killing protesters, help Iranians defeat internet censorship and make any economic concession conditional on the release of political prisoners.
Tehran reignited the conflict because its rulers believed peace threatened their survival. America’s task is not to rescue them with the war they want, but to stand with the Iranian people who can secure the peace their country needs.
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[ H/T WorldNetDaily ]
