Pakistan’s rulers know how to work a room. Washington hears counterterrorism, stability, and nuclear responsibility. Tehran hears brotherhood, resistance, and shared interests. Each audience is encouraged to believe it has found a dependable partner. For years, this could be passed off as realpolitik of a state living in a difficult neighborhood. Under Pakistan’s de facto ruler, Field Marshal Asim Munir, the nuclear state is beginning to look less like Washington’s bridge to Tehran than the ayatollahs’ clearing agent in D.C.
Munir now sits atop a military command centralized around the newly created office of the Chief of Defence Forces, with operational authority over the army, navy, and air force. Constitutional and legislative changes have strengthened his position while Pakistan’s civilian institutions have receded. That concentration of power is part of his appeal abroad. Washington is being asked to see a useful intermediary: a general who can reassure President Donald Trump, speak to Tehran, and impose discipline at home. American officials have heard versions of this pitch before.
Karachi tested that sales pitch. In March, armed mobs stormed the U.S. Consulate after strikes against Iran, breached its outer perimeter, and forced U.S. Marines to defend the compound. Accounts differ over who fired which shots and which rounds caused particular casualties. The central fact does not depend on those disputes: An American diplomatic facility was overrun on Pakistani soil during pro-Iran unrest. Elsewhere, protesters attacked diplomatic missions, schools, hospitals, U.N. facilities, and public buildings. Military personnel were burned alive during an attack on a military base. The unrest produced a serious loss of life.
Pakistan’s response was strikingly mild. Protesters later staged sit-ins demanding justice for those killed while storming the consulate, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, who is the chief enforcer of Munir and a known Iran lackey, offered assurances of action. The men who attacked diplomatic and state facilities did not face the relentless public pursuit Pakistan reserves for the Pakistani Taliban after convoy attacks or for Baloch insurgents after strikes on military installations. No one familiar with the Pakistani security state can mistake this for a lack of capacity. The army can seal cities, sweep neighborhoods, and build cases at speed when it decides a threat matters. Its restraint here was a choice, visible to allies and adversaries alike.
Islamabad has reasons to avoid a rupture with Tehran. The two countries share a border, there is a large Shiite minority, and Pakistan has economic interests of its own. Indulgence toward a mob that overruns an American consulate is still inexcusable. Pakistan can keep channels open with Tehran while protecting diplomats, prosecuting attackers, and making foreign-backed militancy costly. It enforced such lines before when the militants were politically inconvenient. That history makes the current inaction harder to dismiss as mere balancing.
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The Trump administration has relied on Pakistan’s good offices to reach the ayatollahs and explore a deal. The Islamabad memorandum in April was meant to demonstrate American good faith; Iran quickly burned through it. That failure should force a closer look at the messenger as well as the recipient. Make no mistake: Access has value, but only when the intermediary is candid about its interests and willing to spend political capital on the outcome. Pakistan appears eager to collect the prestige of mediation while avoiding the obligations that come with that.
What is the way forward? Washington does not need to cut ties with Islamabad. It should stop mistaking contact for alignment. Protection of diplomatic missions, transparent action against violent networks, and restraint on Iranian influence are reasonable tests of a partner claiming exclusive access in Tehran. Pakistan has not met them. Pakistan is also a key node in the pro-Iran propaganda swarming the global populace. A state that goes soft after an assault on U.S. consulates has not earned the role of a trusted mediator. Munir may keep carrying messages across the divide, but American policy should be built around what his regime does when the price of partnership is real, not around what Pakistan’s generals say in the room.
Saad Khan is an independent researcher on religion and extremism with a Ph.D. in political science from Georgia State University.
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[ H/T Washington Examiner ]
