Steve Eisman: What If OpenAI Actually Fails?
Steve Eisman has spent most of the years since the financial crisis being asked, in his words, to predict the end of the world. In his latest weekly wrap - recorded Thursday night as the 10-year brushed 4.8%, he says he's still not there on AI, but if he were - he lays out exactly how it would happen.
Eisman is not predicting that OpenAI fails - but it is the weak link in a chain that runs from two money-losing labs, through hyperscaler capex, to roughly half of projected US GDP growth - and arguing that it's "not too early to think about" what happens if the link breaks.
Eisman waves off the two "bubble" arguments echoing through the halls - and that both hyperscalers' vanished free cash flow, and Nvidia's circular financing - are survivable if AI pays off. The real vulnerability, he argues, sits one layer down:
From there it's arithmetic:
Between the two labs, Eisman says, "OpenAI is the weaker entity" - pointing to a WSJ report on the 2nd quarter.
(ZH Note; the $12.3 billion Eisman calls "costs" is OpenAI's operating loss, including stock-based compensation, up from $9.3 billion in the first quarter, per WSJ. On $6.7 billion of revenue, that implies an expense line closer to $19 billion. Revenue rose $1 billion; the loss rose $3 billion.)
Then the departures. Chief revenue officer Denise Dresser left in August after roughly eight months, two days after Brad Lightcap ended an eight-year run. Eisman reads both through the lens of an IPO that keeps sliding:
Two fairness notes: Lightcap had already been moved out of the COO role in April, so his exit was telegraphed. And Eisman doesn't mention Fidji Simo, who stepped down in July and was arguably the bigger loss.
The heart of the argument is what unprofitability does to a company's relationship with its funders:
That's why he flags last week's "good news" - OpenAI's ad business hitting a $1 billion annualized run rate - as bad news: earlier this year the company projected $2.4 billion of ad revenue for all of 2026, and $1 billion annualized in September doesn't get there.
"If OpenAI fails, Oracle is in immediate trouble because of the large increase in Oracle's debt levels. Oracle's debt rating is barely above junk. Oracle's S&P credit rating is triple-B-minus, which is quite weak. Like I said before, it has a $600 billion backlog, and half of that backlog is from OpenAI."
That isn't Eisman's inference; it's S&P's. When the agency cut Oracle to BBB- on July 9, it named OpenAI a "key credit risk," put the lab at roughly half of a $638 billion RPO, and spelled out the failure path: if OpenAI can't pay, Oracle is left holding data center leases it can't exit or must re-lease on worse terms.
Eisman's point is that investors have already seen the preview:
"The ramifications of an OpenAI failure extend far beyond just Oracle. Remember I said that AI capex accounts for 50% of US GDP growth. While the other hyperscalers are not quite as dependent on Anthropic and OpenAI as Oracle, they are dependent enough. If OpenAI failed, the hyperscalers, I am sure, would cut back on their capex. So I'm starting to think that the demise of OpenAI could push the US into an almost immediate recession."
Affected sectors are all over the place... It isn't just Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Oracle and Nvidia. It's the investment banks, sitting at peak valuations on a financing cycle that AI is feeding. It's GE Vernova and Quanta on power, Eaton and Rockwell on electrification and automation. The uncomfortable implication: a portfolio that "diversifies" across tech, financials and industrials may own three versions of the same trade.
His answer is reallocation, not stock-picking - healthcare, consumer staples, and within financials the property-and-casualty names - and he names three ETFs by ticker: LVHD, SPLV and KBWP. Then the caveat that should anchor this whole piece:
OpenAI has its own numbers. CFO Sarah Friar told employees that July's annualized revenue already exceeded the entire second quarter, and the company says its run rate has topped $40 billion. Worth knowing: that is a latest-month annualization, while recognized Q2 revenue annualizes closer to $27 billion. Second, strangers have been extremely kind. A March round at a valuation above $852 billion reportedly raised more than $122 billion. Runway isn't the near-term issue, it's the next raise - which is Eisman's point.
Eisman's read of Nvidia's $96.2 billion quarter - revenue up 106% year over year - is that the AI story "continues but is displaying potential weakness," and that "both apparently contradictory ideas can be true." His evidence for the weakness is Note 7 of the 10-Q: five direct customers at 22%, 14%, 13%, 11% and 10% of accounts receivable, which he sums to 70% and assumes "must be the hyperscalers."
Careful there. That disclosure is receivables, not revenue, and Nvidia's direct customers include distributors, ODMs and system integrators, not just clouds. The revenue disclosure in the same filing shows one direct customer at 16% of the quarter. The better version of Eisman's point is one sentence lower in the 10-Q: Nvidia estimates that one "AI research and deployment company" - OpenAI's own description of itself - contributed a meaningful amount of revenue by buying cloud services from Nvidia's customers. Same dependency, no arithmetic error.
And the circularity he mentions in passing is in Nvidia's own release: roughly $7.8 billion of gains on equity securities ran through other income this quarter, which is why GAAP net income ($59.7 billion) tops non-GAAP ($54.0 billion). Nvidia invests in the companies that buy its chips, then books the markups.
Eisman's closing line on all of it:
Watch the entire episode below:
Tyler Durden Wed, 09/09/2026 - 11:00
Continue reading...
[ H/T ZeroHedge ]
Steve Eisman has spent most of the years since the financial crisis being asked, in his words, to predict the end of the world. In his latest weekly wrap - recorded Thursday night as the 10-year brushed 4.8%, he says he's still not there on AI, but if he were - he lays out exactly how it would happen.
Eisman is not predicting that OpenAI fails - but it is the weak link in a chain that runs from two money-losing labs, through hyperscaler capex, to roughly half of projected US GDP growth - and arguing that it's "not too early to think about" what happens if the link breaks.
The chain: two companies, $700 billion of capex, half of GDP growth
Eisman waves off the two "bubble" arguments echoing through the halls - and that both hyperscalers' vanished free cash flow, and Nvidia's circular financing - are survivable if AI pays off. The real vulnerability, he argues, sits one layer down:
From there it's arithmetic:
OpenAI is... the weakest link
Between the two labs, Eisman says, "OpenAI is the weaker entity" - pointing to a WSJ report on the 2nd quarter.
(ZH Note; the $12.3 billion Eisman calls "costs" is OpenAI's operating loss, including stock-based compensation, up from $9.3 billion in the first quarter, per WSJ. On $6.7 billion of revenue, that implies an expense line closer to $19 billion. Revenue rose $1 billion; the loss rose $3 billion.)
Then the departures. Chief revenue officer Denise Dresser left in August after roughly eight months, two days after Brad Lightcap ended an eight-year run. Eisman reads both through the lens of an IPO that keeps sliding:
Two fairness notes: Lightcap had already been moved out of the COO role in April, so his exit was telegraphed. And Eisman doesn't mention Fidji Simo, who stepped down in July and was arguably the bigger loss.
The heart of the argument is what unprofitability does to a company's relationship with its funders:
That's why he flags last week's "good news" - OpenAI's ad business hitting a $1 billion annualized run rate - as bad news: earlier this year the company projected $2.4 billion of ad revenue for all of 2026, and $1 billion annualized in September doesn't get there.
Oracle is the first domino - and the market has already run the drill once
"If OpenAI fails, Oracle is in immediate trouble because of the large increase in Oracle's debt levels. Oracle's debt rating is barely above junk. Oracle's S&P credit rating is triple-B-minus, which is quite weak. Like I said before, it has a $600 billion backlog, and half of that backlog is from OpenAI."
That isn't Eisman's inference; it's S&P's. When the agency cut Oracle to BBB- on July 9, it named OpenAI a "key credit risk," put the lab at roughly half of a $638 billion RPO, and spelled out the failure path: if OpenAI can't pay, Oracle is left holding data center leases it can't exit or must re-lease on worse terms.
Eisman's point is that investors have already seen the preview:
Why it doesn't stop at tech - and what he's doing about it
"The ramifications of an OpenAI failure extend far beyond just Oracle. Remember I said that AI capex accounts for 50% of US GDP growth. While the other hyperscalers are not quite as dependent on Anthropic and OpenAI as Oracle, they are dependent enough. If OpenAI failed, the hyperscalers, I am sure, would cut back on their capex. So I'm starting to think that the demise of OpenAI could push the US into an almost immediate recession."
Affected sectors are all over the place... It isn't just Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Oracle and Nvidia. It's the investment banks, sitting at peak valuations on a financing cycle that AI is feeding. It's GE Vernova and Quanta on power, Eaton and Rockwell on electrification and automation. The uncomfortable implication: a portfolio that "diversifies" across tech, financials and industrials may own three versions of the same trade.
His answer is reallocation, not stock-picking - healthcare, consumer staples, and within financials the property-and-casualty names - and he names three ETFs by ticker: LVHD, SPLV and KBWP. Then the caveat that should anchor this whole piece:
That Said...
OpenAI has its own numbers. CFO Sarah Friar told employees that July's annualized revenue already exceeded the entire second quarter, and the company says its run rate has topped $40 billion. Worth knowing: that is a latest-month annualization, while recognized Q2 revenue annualizes closer to $27 billion. Second, strangers have been extremely kind. A March round at a valuation above $852 billion reportedly raised more than $122 billion. Runway isn't the near-term issue, it's the next raise - which is Eisman's point.
One more: Nvidia, where "both things can be true"
Eisman's read of Nvidia's $96.2 billion quarter - revenue up 106% year over year - is that the AI story "continues but is displaying potential weakness," and that "both apparently contradictory ideas can be true." His evidence for the weakness is Note 7 of the 10-Q: five direct customers at 22%, 14%, 13%, 11% and 10% of accounts receivable, which he sums to 70% and assumes "must be the hyperscalers."
Careful there. That disclosure is receivables, not revenue, and Nvidia's direct customers include distributors, ODMs and system integrators, not just clouds. The revenue disclosure in the same filing shows one direct customer at 16% of the quarter. The better version of Eisman's point is one sentence lower in the 10-Q: Nvidia estimates that one "AI research and deployment company" - OpenAI's own description of itself - contributed a meaningful amount of revenue by buying cloud services from Nvidia's customers. Same dependency, no arithmetic error.
And the circularity he mentions in passing is in Nvidia's own release: roughly $7.8 billion of gains on equity securities ran through other income this quarter, which is why GAAP net income ($59.7 billion) tops non-GAAP ($54.0 billion). Nvidia invests in the companies that buy its chips, then books the markups.
Eisman's closing line on all of it:
Watch the entire episode below:
Tyler Durden Wed, 09/09/2026 - 11:00
Continue reading...
[ H/T ZeroHedge ]
