Criminal law is constitutional law

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With arguments over the Second Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause on the near horizon, this column seeks to provide some tranquil and more generalized ideas – a moment of Thanksgiving holiday respite. Whether you are a Supreme Court follower who usually shunts criminal law to the side, or an experienced criminal law reader who might enjoy some holiday dinner thoughts for your friends and family, this column seeks to demonstrate that much of criminal law is actually constitutional law – and perhaps show why that can be so interesting. To do so, I will scatter some examples from last term, drawn from my recently published Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term, Criminal Cases booklet. When explaining criminal law to your friends or just opining over Thanksgiving dinner, I’d like to show why your mantra should be “crim law is con law” and vice versa.

Winship – criminal law fundamentals are constitutional law

Every criminal law class I have taught over 40 years, from 1L first semester through advanced criminal procedure or federal criminal law, has begun with the same case: 1970’s In re Winship. Even non-lawyers know from film and TV that the prosecution’s high burden for proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt. But do they know that this is constitutionally required? And perhaps more interesting, that this standard is nowhere, textually, in that document?

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,” wrote Justice William Brennan Jr. for the Winship court. If only all supreme court decisions had such clear and succinct rule statements.

But why is this the rule? It is not found either in the body of the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, which was adopted soon after the Constitution and focused largely on criminal law protections. Winship‘s answer: because that standard “dates back at least from our early years as a Nation,” “t is now accepted in common law jurisdictions,” it is expressed “in many opinions of this Court,” and it has “long been assumed” to be “constitutionally required.” Thus history, tradition, and precedent support it. Perhaps most fundamentally, a high standard of proof, harder to satisfy than in civil law cases, is essential to fundamental fairness for the public as well as individuals charged with crimes. It is “indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community” as well as “every individual” exposed to imprisonment. Or, as Justice John Harlan II wrote in an influential concurrence, this standard is “bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”

Thus, a fundamental premise of criminal law, Winship, is constitutional law too. Moreover, and just by the way, Winship demonstrates that the “incorporation” theory of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause (that is, applying the Bill of Rights to the states) is not limited to concepts stated expressly in the Bill of Rights itself – as “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is not. Critics of non-textual constitutional rights – like privacy, a right to travel, a right to refuse medical treatment (like mask wearing?), or even a right to terminate a pregnancy – must confront the application of their literalist theory to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, too. For this reason, I also teach Winship in every constitutional law class.

There are almost no crimes mentioned in the Constitution

This sometimes surprises 1L students (and others). But the goal of the Constitution was to (re)describe a system of government, and form “a more perfect Union” after the prior Articles of Confederation had proved unsatisfactory. It was not to write a criminal code. The states were then (and still are) the primary forum for criminal law.

So the Constitution defines only one crime, treason (in Article III, section 3). It mentions a few others, like “Bribery” (in Article II, section 4) and “Breach of the Peace” with a general reference to “Felony” (in Article I, section 6). And of course the impeachment clause (Article II section 4) mentions “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” without definition. Again, states were expected to take care of the substantive definition and application of virtually all criminal law. (However, as I explained some years ago, the First Congress in 1790 did enact over two dozen federal crimes.)

Yet a large focus of the Bill of Rights is criminal procedure

Three years after the Constitution was drafted, the Bill of Rights focused on criminal law rights in at least four proposed amendments (the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth). I won’t list the multitude of rights captured there, but they form the bulk of all criminal procedure law school classes today. The right to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and compelled self-incrimination, and the rights to counsel, jury trials, and no cruel and unusual punishments – and much more – are all embodied in the Bill of Rights.

One example from last term: in Villareal v. Texas the court had to interpret the Sixth Amendment right to “Assistance of Counsel” to decide (unanimously) that a criminal trial judge can order that the defendant not discuss their ongoing testimony with their attorney during an overnight recess.

Why was the Bill of Rights so focused on criminal procedure rights? It’s a fun question to ask students, or at the Thanksgiving table if things get slow. Sooner or later someone gives the soundbite answer: “because most of the constitution’s framers were crooks.” They were certainly guilty of treason – then and still today a capital (that is, death penalty) offense, as well as other crimes (violence, destruction of property, incitement, and more). Had the revolutionary Framers been captured by the government (the British) they likely would have been hung. Instead, during the course of the revolution, numbers had been tried in absentia, found guilty by officials (not juries), and had their houses searched and occupied by troops. Cruel and unusual torture had been inflicted on some captured compatriots. When constitutional ratifying conventions demanded a bill of rights, protections from unfair criminal processes were therefore topmost on the minds of many drafters (if not perhaps “the People” at the time).

(Another aside: ask your lawyer friends to compare the content of civil procedure versus criminal procedure classes today. The latter full-semester course is almost entirely constitutional law – I used to call my own crim pro class “Con Law Three.” By contrast, civil procedure classes, also a full semester, focus largely on the nitty-gritty details of federal rules, only occasionally wandering into statutes or the Constitution.)

In addition to the four explicitly criminal-focused amendments, you might then add general constitutional ideas that are bound to capture some criminal law cases: the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Amendments. The First Amendment’s direction, that “Congress shall make no law” regarding (“respecting”) or abridging freedoms of religion, speech, and the press, is a constitutional law command against criminal laws as well as civil. So too is a protection of a right to keep and bear arms, and to not have government troops quartered in “any” house (not just your own).

And then consider the “great generalities” of the Constitution

In his 1921 Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School (subsequently published as “The Nature of the Judicial Process”), future Supreme Court Justice (and then New York Court of Appeals Judge) Benjamin Cardozo discussed “the great generalities of the Constitution.” Among these, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment are huge sources of criminal law doctrine. Just last term, for example, the procedural steps required to apply the Equal Protection Clause against racial (and other) bias in jury selection, and the idea that due process and judicial integrity requires a “miscarriage of justice” exception to guilty plea waivers, received focused Supreme Court attention (in Pitchford v. Cain and Hunter v. United States, respectively).

Criminal law cases focused on the meaning and application of these broad constitutional requirements arise regularly almost every Supreme Court term. Indeed, as I advise my students every year (again I aspire to teach with a smile, not didactic cynicism): no matter what arguments you make on the defense side of a criminal case, always add the words “and in violation of due process” to preserve at least a thread of a constitutional argument that you may not even perceive at the moment.

In addition to equal protection and due process, I (and others) would add the Ninth Amendment, which speaks of unspecified “rights … retained by the people.” Justices have sometimes suggested that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments state nothing but “truism,” while other Supreme Court decisions have relied (at least in part) on the Ninth. For some, invocation of the Ninth Amendment may provoke if not laughter (it having been referred to by one academic as a “constitutional jester”), then a distinctly conservative or “originalist” rejection. Yet other conservative scholars such as John Yoo and Calvin Massey (my late former colleague) have written expansively about it. As Randy Barnett has argued, the Ninth amendment “means what it says,” and is “a significant guarantee of individual liberty.” If that is so, then it is (or could be) another source of criminal law protection for criminal defendants.

For example, Griswold v. Connecticut recognized a constitutional right to privacy in the criminal law context, resting in part (and almost entirely for three justices) on the Ninth Amendment. Less controversially, perhaps, Chief Justice Warren Burger later invoked the amendment in the 1980 case of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia to support an “unarticulated” constitutional right for the public (and the press) to attend criminal trials. And in 2000, even Justice Antonin Scalia agreed (in a solo dissent to Troxel v. Granville, a non-criminal case) that the Ninth Amendment recognizes unenumerated rights. When you tell your Thanksgiving dinner companions that criminal law is constitutional law, don’t forget the Ninth Amendment.

So criminal law is, very often, constitutional law

Thus it should be unsurprising (as detailed in my Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term, Criminal Law booklet) that 22 of the court’s merits decisions last term that address criminal law involved elements of constitutional law (17 fully argued cases plus five summary (unargued) decisions). That’s a substantial percentage of the court’s entire merits opinions docket, roughly a quarter or more.

Statutory criminal law cases also often involve constitutional law

By now I hope that you are persuaded: criminal law is (often) constitutional law. “But wait – there’s more!” When you combine the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause with the oft-cited judicial doctrine of constitutional avoidance, criminal cases requiring statutory interpretation also fall into this category. That is, these are criminal law cases that involve consideration of constitutional law. Advocates in statutory cases often raise potential constitutional objections to a criminal statute or to its application in their case, or they may raise constitutional law ideas in favor of their preferred interpretation. In addition, an understanding of constitutional doctrine can be necessary to properly evaluate the merits of a statutory claim. The bottom line is that, in many statutory criminal cases, explication or consideration of constitutional law is necessary or helpful to explain the result.

Just a few examples from last term: In Barrett v. United States, the court had to mine the details of double jeopardy doctrine to agree, unanimously, that a statute could be interpreted as not permitting two convictions for a single act, thereby avoiding a constitutional problem. In Olivier v. City of Brandon, the court had to examine Olivier’s constitutional claims in order to decide whether the federal civil rights statutes were a proper vehicle for him to sue under. And in Whitton v. Dixon, the court had to briefly explain the constitutional Giglio doctrine, regarding a prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment information, to reverse an application of the federal habeas corpus statue.

Immigration cases also often require constitutional law, either to dispose of the merits or to resolve statutory issues in them. Last term’s birthright citizenship case, Trump v. Barbara, is the most obvious example. Because immigration and criminal law cases are often intertwined – consider recent ICE arrests, detentions, and criminal violation grounds for removal – I include them in my annual review as well as the purview of this column. And even civil cases that I consider related to criminal law often require consideration of constitutional law concepts. For example, last term’s Hencely v. Fluor Corp., rejecting a claim of government contractor immunity, required consideration of constitutional preemption doctrine.

In other words, criminal law mixed with constitutional law is everywhere.

Conclusion: Happy Thanksgiving

Last week many of us were focused on the details of elections around the country, big and small. And next week, after Thanksgiving, will be chock full of criminal law and related Supreme Court oral arguments. So I’ve tried to give you a break today, and provide a few thoughts that are, perhaps, entertaining, or provocative, or at least interesting ways to navigate your mealtime gatherings (rather than focusing on the usual subjects). For some of you, perhaps this column has simply demonstrated what you already considered obvious; or perhaps it has opened interesting linkages in your mind between constitutional law and criminal law. In any case, thanks for reading this far. Next week I hope you are fortunate enough to breathe relaxing breaths, give thanks, and dwell not on legal minutiae but on what really matters.

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