Realism emphasizes power; liberalism emphasizes rules. But both recognize that a great power’s cheapest yet most valuable asset is credibility. By this standard, President Donald Trump’s decision to ease sanctions on Russia, effectively abandoning Ukraine, risks exchanging long-term strategic capital for short-term tactical gains.
The immediate benefits are real: easing oil prices and inflation, freeing American resources to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific, and attempting a “reverse Nixon” strategy to drive a wedge between Russia and China. But these gains are questionable, and their long-term costs could be enormous.
First, a wedge strategy works only when the targeted country has incentives to switch sides. Russia’s economic lifelines are increasingly tied to China, while Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political legitimacy rests heavily on an anti-Western narrative. Sanctions relief would hardly pull Moscow toward Washington. Instead, Putin could play the two powers against each other, extracting concessions from both.
Second, sanctions are a form of “weaponized interdependence,” whose effectiveness depends on credible, sustained enforcement. If sanctions can be withdrawn whenever oil prices rise or an attractive deal emerges, America’s financial deterrence diminishes. Iran, North Korea, and Beijing will recalculate the costs of defying Washington.
This brings us to “time inconsistency,” for which Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott received the 2004 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. Their central insight was that credible rules and commitments often produce better outcomes than discretionary policies that change with immediate incentives. Trump’s transactional approach risks precisely this problem: if American commitments can be reversed for short-term advantage, why should anyone trust them?
Third, and most damaging, America’s alliance system is its greatest asymmetric advantage over China. Abandoning Ukraine would send the same message to Tokyo, Taipei, Seoul, and Warsaw: American commitments have expiration dates.
This danger is compounded by Trump’s growing “friend-foe ambiguity.” Strategic ambiguity can serve deterrence, but ambiguity about America’s friends and adversaries is another matter. When allies fear Washington may bargain away their interests to secure deals with adversaries, trust erodes. Offshore balancing may save money today, but abandoning partners raises future deterrence costs.
China could emerge as the biggest strategic winner, not because Russia would become more dependent on Beijing, but because America would become less trustworthy. Admittedly, a less isolated Russia would gain independence from China, weakening Beijing’s bargaining position. But a victorious Russia, freed from sanctions and emboldened by territorial gains, would threaten Europe and America. China would benefit without bearing the costs of confrontation. Most importantly, doubts about American credibility could be invaluable to Beijing over Taiwan. If Washington sacrifices Ukraine for a deal with Moscow, why should Taipei believe American commitments would survive an attractive bargain with Beijing? Such uncertainty would weaken deterrence, encourage Chinese coercion, and unsettle America’s Indo-Pacific allies.
China also stands to reap substantial postwar economic benefits. Ukrainians might blame Washington more than Beijing for territorial losses, leaving room for Chinese investment in reconstruction and infrastructure. Russia, meanwhile, would have little reason to abandon its economic relationship with China. China’s industrial base, technology, supply chains, and vast market would remain indispensable to Russia’s recovery and modernization. Moscow might diversify its partnerships, but diversification would not mean decoupling from Beijing. China could retain economic advantages while gaining geopolitical opportunities.
Russia would emerge as another winner. It could retain conquered territory, escape isolation, regain access to international markets and capital, and rebuild its military. Putin would also gain freedom to maneuver between Washington and Beijing, extracting advantages from both. Europe, by contrast, would face an emboldened Russia while losing confidence in its American security guarantor. European governments would confront enormous rearmament costs, economic uncertainty, and diminished American support. Greater strategic independence might eventually follow, but the transition would be costly and dangerous.
The resulting international order could be profoundly unfavorable to America: a three-polar world of the United States, China, and Russia — two economic superpowers but three nuclear military powers, two of which are authoritarian and hostile to liberal democracy. Unlike the bipolar Cold War order, this arrangement would feature competing military powers without stable rules. If territorial conquest becomes negotiable and security guarantees unreliable, smaller countries will seek protection through military buildups, shifting alliances, and increasingly, nuclear weapons. The world would move toward the law of the jungle, where might makes right and great powers divide spheres of influence. Such a world would be harder, more dangerous, and more expensive for America to manage.
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America’s greatest strategic advantage is not simply its military, economic, or technological superiority, but other nations’ willingness to trust it and stand alongside it. Credibility transforms American power into collective power. Once lost, that multiplier cannot easily be restored. Trading it for cheaper oil, temporary relief from European commitments, or an illusory wedge between Russia and China would be a disastrous bargain.
Power protects principles, but principles also multiply power. America’s long-term interest lies in preserving an international order in which allies willingly stand with Washington. America can afford to lose a battle. It cannot afford to lose its credibility.
Jianli Yang is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a columnist for National Review.
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[ H/T Washington Examiner ]
