Listening to the past

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Originalism sometimes requires judges to sift a historical record to determine what the law is. That is because it holds that we should give the Constitution its original meaning, and the text of the Constitution does not always make that meaning readily apparent to modern readers.

In a column last year, I considered a common criticism of originalism: that judges make poor historians. Maybe, I concluded, but they can still be good (originalist) judges.

A related criticism of originalism is that history makes a poor judge. Judges must be decisive, but historical inquiry is often inconclusive. This month’s column considers this criticism – specifically, two common forms that it takes: (1) originalism attributes too much significance to historical silence, and (2) originalism cannot reconcile dissonant historical traditions.

The role of history in text-and-history cases

Originalists turn to the historical record for a variety of purposes. Because originalism holds that the Constitution means today what it meant in 1789 (except to the extent that it has been lawfully amended), understanding the meaning of its words requires looking to historical sources to figure out how those words were used at the time the Constitution was ratified. To take an uncontroversial example, while a modern reader might read “domestic violence” and think “spousal abuse,” historical context reveals that “domestic Violence” in the guarantee clause means internal civil unrest.

Sometimes, however, originalists look to the historical record for purposes other than uncovering the contemporary definition of the Constitution’s words. Sometimes, it is necessary to look to history to understand what those words did, legally speaking.

For example, it is relatively easy to understand the opening words of Article III: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” But what is the significance of the decision to give the “judicial Power of the United States” to Article III courts and not, say, to “the executive Departments”? The answer to that question is not to be found exclusively in a dictionary definition of “judicial Power.” It is to be found in historical sources revealing what, in 1789, the “judicial Power” enabled an actor to do. Whatever that is, Article III courts can do it, and an executive department cannot.

Similarly, the Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” But we know that that right has always been understood to coexist with some limited forms of regulation. We will not necessarily be able to figure out what forms of regulation are permissible just by looking at how “right” and “infringed” were used in old dictionaries. Courts must uncover a more complex historical idea.

That is why 2022’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, an originalist opinion in which the court held that New York’s concealed carry law was inconsistent with the Second Amendment, requires courts adjudicating Second Amendment challenges to move past the text to look at history: namely, “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” If the government can prove that its firearms regulation fits the history, then the government may prevail even though it seeks to restrict the right described in the text.

Silences that speak?

One consequence of the Bruen methodology is that, if the government cannot find a historical regulation that resembles its modern regulation, then it may lose. This is a problem, critics argue, because there are plenty of reasons the legislatures of the past might have chosen not to regulate in a particular way.

For example, the founding generation did not disarm casual users of intoxicating substances. One reason may be that they believed such a regulation would infringe the right to keep and bear arms. An early refusal to regulate on that ground would then provide good evidence that the right was originally understood to foreclose the would-be regulation. But there are other possibilities: the regulation would have been inexpedient, impolitic, unnecessary. Or perhaps it just never occurred to the legislators.

If the government cannot fit its modern regulation into the historical regulatory tradition, then the modern regulation fails Bruen’s test. Thus, Bruen does not distinguish these sources of silence. It seems to draw the same inference from them: unconstitutionality.

This criticism – that the lack of a historical regulatory tradition doesn’t tell you very much – is misplaced for several reasons. First, historical legislatures legislated against a background common-law tradition that included robust principles concerning appropriate firearm regulation, even if those principles weren’t spelled out in legislation. The common-law practices on which the court relied in, say, United States v. Rahimi (in which it upheld a federal law disarming persons under a domestic violence restraining order) are part of that tradition and reveal a baseline principle: the state may act on demonstrated or threatened misuse of firearms by individuals. Legislative silence was not regulatory silence – the common law hummed on.

Second, and relatedly, courts do not treat historical regulations as “molds” into which modern legislators must pour their regulatory ambitions. Rather, as Justice Amy Coney Barrett explained in her concurrence in Rahimi, the historical inquiry “demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold.” Principles convert some silences into spaces for modern regulatory innovation: firearms laws that differ in detail, but not in principle, from their predecessors. Conversely, if no historical regulation anywhere, anytime reflects the principle animating a restriction on someone’s ability to keep and bear arms (as was the case in last term’s decision rejecting a federal attempt to disarm someone based on casual drug use in United States v. Hemani), then that “silence” speaks more eloquently than originalism’s critics imagine.

Finally, and most important in my view, the criticism mistakes the role of the historical inquiry in Second Amendment adjudications. The text of the Second Amendment is the first and best evidence of its meaning, and it is always speaking. Bruen directs courts to begin with the text and turn to history only after concluding that the regulation implicates the Second Amendment. Before a court ever turns to the “historical tradition of firearm regulation,” then, it has already concluded that the government is restricting someone’s ability to keep and bear arms. To the extent that silences in the historical record create doubt about whether that restriction is permissible or impermissible, the textual analysis justifies shifting the burden of that uncertainty onto the government. The government has failed to justify restricting what the Constitution describes as protected conduct. Tie goes to the rights-holder.

Sounds that signify nothing?

Sometimes, judges face the opposite problem: not silence, but too much noise. Professor Rachel Bayefsky wrote last week about seemingly dissonant traditions at play in Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, a case in which the court heard argument on Nov. 10.

Sun Valley involves an appeal from a Department of Labor enforcement action imposing penalties on Sun Valley Orchards for breaching work contracts with foreign laborers brought into the country under the H-2A visa program. The court must decide whether that enforcement action, which the department both prosecuted and adjudicated, belongs instead in an Article III court.

Recall that only Article III courts hold “the judicial Power of the United States.” History reveals that the government needs the “judicial Power” to deprive someone – like Sun Valley Orchards – of a private right, like property. But it does not need to exercise judicial power to exercise a sovereign (or so-called “public”) right, like the right to decide who enters the country, or to confer a privilege, like a visa. To put it a little more simply: If the government wants to take money that is already in your bank account, then it must take you to court. If you want the government to pay you money that is in the Treasury, then the government can handle your request “in house” (i.e., in the agency charged with administering the benefits scheme).

Bayefsky describes these as competing traditions brought into conflict by the parties’ claims: Sun Valley invokes its private right to the money the department seeks to collect from it; the department brandishes its sovereign power and the conditions it attached to the privilege of hiring foreign laborers. Bayefsky suggests that the conflict creates an indeterminacy, which the court might resolve by turning to considerations other than text and history to reach a conclusion about what the Constitution requires today.

Many voices, like silences, present a challenge to originalism. But varied traditions do not foreclose determinacy, any more than polyphony forecloses harmony. Sometimes, as in Sun Valley, the traditions proceed in counterpoint.

From an originalist perspective, the history at the heart of Sun Valley reflects a single, coherent constitutional rule: When the executive wants to take away someone’s private property, it must go to court. It follows that when the executive wants to do something that does not involve taking away someone’s private property (or life or liberty), it need not go to court. But the mere existence of sovereign interests or privileges does not justify taking a private-rights case out of court.

Of course, it is possible for the Constitution to point one way, while more recent traditions point another. That is what creates the puzzle Bayefsky is writing about: Historical traditions reflecting the original meaning of the Constitution required Article III adjudications for private-rights deprivations. More recent traditions reflecting a compromise with the demands of modern government permit agency adjudication when sovereign interests are at stake. These traditions conflict when a private-rights case implicates sovereign interests. When that happens, as Bayefsky says, courts must decide: which tradition?

The existence of competing traditions is one reason to prefer an originalist text-and-history method to a non-originalist history-and-tradition method (as I have written in a previous column). Originalism’s answer to “which tradition” is, in a way, “neither.” Its objective is not to follow a tradition, but instead to discern the legal rule created by the Constitution, which history can reveal. While it may not be easy to know into which category the rights at issue in Sun Valley fall, the court is looking for a single answer, at a single point in time. The law supplies that single answer. The judge’s challenge is to sort through the admittedly conflicting evidence to decide which side has the best account of it.

Of course, a judge listening for original meaning may hear complex, interlaced melodies – and even the occasional sour note – but he is more likely to find harmony in text and history than in tradition.

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[ H/T SCOTUSblog ]
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