Lost in the cacophony of commentary on the U.S. war on Iran is a brilliant opening gambit that Vice President JD Vance recently proffered as an off-ramp for the U.S. war on Iran: Washington would have no objection to a peaceful Iran nuclear energy program that included domestic uranium enrichment levels that were below the threshold levels of highly enriched uranium required for nuclear weapons.
Vance declared in an Oct. 6 interview, “If you [Iran] don’t want a nuclear weapon, then why do you need 60% enriched fuel? And if you want to show commitment to not building a nuclear weapon, don’t build highly enriched fuel … if they [Iran] want to show a commitment to not building a nuclear weapon, they would do something meaningful on their enrichment capacity.”
So, Washington has now signaled Tehran that America is willing to drop its three core demands: zero nuclear enrichment, regime change, and relinquishment of de facto Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Clearly, from the perspective of the United States, the status quo ante is preferable to the current stalemate. Yet, the harsh reality is that Washington will have to settle for less than the status quo ante. Such a minus status quo ante end state, however, would be consistent with President Donald Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy, both of which highlight that the Middle East is no longer an American vital national interest.
Manifestly, the war on Iran neither safeguards nor furthers any U.S. vital national interest. Arguably, the war has adversely impacted America’s economic and military security — higher energy prices, and redirected and reduced military assets. Trump gambled on a roll of the dice, but they did not roll in his favor.
It’s clear that the ball has been passed to Vance to extricate the United States from the cul-de-sac of the current war. He can succeed.
Vance should follow up on his Oct. 6 statement on Iranian nuclear enrichment with a speech (or interview) that reaffirms the U.S. interpretation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as extensively spelled out by senior government officials in the July 1968 Senate hearings on the ratification of the NPT. He should highlight 3 key points that have enduring validity.
First, as then Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasized: “The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.” He stressed that the NPT was very narrowly tailored to prohibit nonnuclear weapons states from the manufacture, acquisition, or transfer of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, what was not specifically prohibited was permitted.
Second, William C. Foster, then the lead negotiator of the NPT and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, clarified that pursuing peaceful full-cycle nuclear enrichment activities under the safeguards provisions of Article III of the treaty would be permitted: “Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III.”
Third, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze confirmed that military uses of nuclear energy not specifically related to nuclear explosive devices are not prohibited and therefore permitted under the NPT. He pointed out, for example, that non-nuclear-weapons states could have their own nuclear-powered submarines.
Vance should also point out that (a) neither Russia (then the Soviet Union) nor China has ever challenged the U.S. interpretation of the NPT, and (b) both Germany (then West Germany) and Japan — which have significant civilian nuclear programs with domestic enrichment capabilities — have explicitly incorporated the American interpretation in their NPT signing and ratification declarations. Vance should also note that the U.S. did not object to their signing and ratification declarations, including the insistence of the right of withdrawal from the NPT.
THE MEDIA LIED TO YOU, AGAIN. TRUMP DID NOT SAY IRAN SHOULD ‘TAKE OUT’ LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO
Tehran could respond by (a) noting that it did not insist on others accepting Iran’s interpretation of the NPT and that it had no objection to the reaffirmation of America’s interpretation of the treaty, (b) reaffirming its commitment to the existing fatwa against Iranian nuclear weapons, and (c) confirming its intention to remain in the NPT in its current framework.
The remaining issues requiring Congressional action (such as removal of sanctions) or no-objection from U.S. allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) could then be addressed without the threat of renewed war. Vance would reiterate his consistent message: the U.S. would be guided by its vital national interests. Tehran has consistently emphasized that it would be guided by its vital national interests. The elusive quest for a U.S.-Iran modus vivendi would be within reach.
Samir Tata is the founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, and author of the book Reflections on Grand Strategy: The Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century.
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[ H/T Washington Examiner ]
