Guest Post by Nick Giambruno
Forget the press conferences, casualty estimates, satellite images, and declarations of victory.
In my view, one metric will tell us who won the Iran war:
Who controls the Strait of Hormuz when the fighting ends?
Hormuz represents the most important energy chokepoint on the planet.
Iran sits along its northern shore and has spent decades preparing missiles, drones, naval forces, and other weapons to control the traffic through it.
If Iran emerges from this war with the ability to decide who passes through Hormuz, under what conditions, and at what cost, the implications will extend far beyond the Persian Gulf.
It would mean the US—the country that has policed the world’s oceans and guaranteed the flow of global commerce since WW2—could no longer guarantee passage through the world’s most important energy corridor.
That would strike at the credibility of American power.
Taking that leverage away from Iran would require much more than bombing missile sites.
The US would need to suppress Iranian missiles and drones across a vast mountainous coastline. It would need to seize and hold territory. And because Iran could launch ballistic missiles from deeper inside the country against oil infrastructure across the Persian Gulf, securing the coastline would not solve the problem.
That points toward the one option Washington wants to avoid: a ground invasion.
Iran presents a much harder target than Iraq or Afghanistan.
Persia has existed as a coherent civilization and geopolitical entity for thousands of years. Mountains form natural defensive barriers across much of the country. Iran covers roughly 1.6 million square kilometers—about 40 times the size of Switzerland.
It also has strategic depth.
Iran can draw support from regional partners and militias, while Russia and China have strong incentives to prevent Washington from installing a US-friendly government in Tehran.
For China, Iran sits along important trade routes and supplies energy. For Russia, Iran provides a partner on its southern flank and an important link through the Caspian region.
Neither country wants Washington to control Tehran.
That means any attempt to conquer Iran could draw more weapons, intelligence, supplies, and other assistance from Russia and China into the conflict.
The US struggled for 20 years in Afghanistan, a far poorer country with fewer resources and weaker military capabilities.
Iran would present a much larger problem.
For argument’s sake, suppose the US did seize Iran’s coastline and islands around Hormuz. Iran could still launch ballistic missiles from the interior against refineries, pipelines, ports, desalination plants, and other infrastructure across the Gulf.
The US might reopen the Strait only to find that Iran had destroyed much of the infrastructure needed to export oil through it, making the reopening moot.
Faced with the bleak prospects of a successful ground invasion, the US or Israel could resort to the ultimate weapon: nuclear bombs.
Iran understands that possibility and has spent decades preparing its government and military to survive attacks on its leadership and command structure. The threat of a nuclear strike would also give Tehran an overwhelming incentive to acquire its own nuclear deterrent before its enemies could destroy it.
Russia and China would also have strong incentives to prevent the US or Israel from crossing the nuclear threshold against Iran. They could respond by extending security guarantees, deploying forces, or taking other steps designed to deter an attack.
The danger goes far beyond Iran.
If the US or Israel used nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary, they would shatter a taboo that has held since 1945. Other nuclear powers would have to reconsider the assumptions underlying their own deterrence strategies.
Could Russia conclude that nuclear weapons had become legitimate tools of war in Ukraine or Europe? Could China reach the same conclusion over Taiwan? What would it mean for India and Pakistan?
I discussed this risk on a private call with a former US Army Special Forces veteran who has extensive experience with the region.
His concern was that once one side crosses the nuclear threshold, nobody can guarantee where the escalation ends. Nuclear powers facing the possibility of further strikes could confront a “use it or lose it” calculation over parts of their arsenals.
That is the problem with the idea of a “limited” nuclear war.
The people who start one do not get to decide where it ends.
Using nuclear weapons against Iran in the hope that the conflict would remain contained would amount to rolling the dice with civilization itself.
I do not consider that the base-case scenario. Mutually assured destruction still gives the major nuclear powers enormous incentives to avoid crossing that threshold.
But the possibility matters because the consequences would dwarf every other geopolitical risk.
And even a nuclear attack would not guarantee the outcome Washington or Israel wants.
Iran covers roughly 1.6 million square kilometers—about 40 times the size of Switzerland—with mountain ranges that provide natural protection and strategic depth. A nuclear strike could destroy military installations, command centers, and cities without eliminating every element of the Iranian government or its ability to retaliate.
Any surviving Iranian forces would have powerful incentives to inflict as much damage as possible before losing that capability.
Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona would represent an obvious potential target. Iran could also target the vulnerable infrastructure that keeps the Gulf monarchies functioning: refineries, ports, pipelines, power plants, and desalination facilities.
Even the use of nuclear weapons would not guarantee that the US and Israel could eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten the regional order. Iran could survive with enough military capability to inflict catastrophic damage on Israel and destabilize Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies.
And if those monarchies fall—or conclude that Washington can no longer protect them—the consequences would reach far beyond the battlefield.
The petrodollar system itself could become another casualty.
In that sense, Iran does not need nuclear weapons of its own to possess a form of strategic deterrence. Its ability to threaten the infrastructure underpinning Israel and the Gulf states gives it the potential to produce unconventional consequences with conventional weapons.
That is why I think Iran will retain substantial leverage over Hormuz regardless of how much damage the US and Israel inflict on the country.
And if that happens, the consequences could shake the foundations of the US-led world order.
History gives us a good idea of what such a turning point can look like.
In 1956, the Suez Crisis exposed a reality that Britain could no longer hide: it remained a major power, but it no longer controlled the world order. In other words, the Suez Crisis revealed that the emperor had no clothes.
Hormuz could play the same role for the US.
If Washington cannot reopen the Strait on its own terms—or must accept a world in which Tehran influences who passes and at what cost—the message to allies and rivals will become hard to ignore.
The world’s leading military power can no longer guarantee commerce through the most important energy corridor on Earth.
Consider the symbolism.
The US Fifth Fleet previously operated from Bahrain, inside the Persian Gulf. If Iran gains enough control over Hormuz to dictate passage through the Strait, the Fifth Fleet itself would operate behind a chokepoint that its principal regional enemy can threaten.
That would mark more than a military setback.
It would represent a massive geopolitical downgrade.
If Hormuz becomes America’s Suez moment, the shock could reach far beyond oil markets. It could threaten the dollar, your investments, and your savings.
I’ve prepared a free report, The Most Dangerous Economic Crisis in 100 Years… the Top 3 Strategies You Need Right Now, to help you understand the risks and prepare. Click here to get your copy.
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[ H/T The Burning Platform ]
Forget the press conferences, casualty estimates, satellite images, and declarations of victory.
In my view, one metric will tell us who won the Iran war:
Who controls the Strait of Hormuz when the fighting ends?
Hormuz represents the most important energy chokepoint on the planet.
Iran sits along its northern shore and has spent decades preparing missiles, drones, naval forces, and other weapons to control the traffic through it.
If Iran emerges from this war with the ability to decide who passes through Hormuz, under what conditions, and at what cost, the implications will extend far beyond the Persian Gulf.
It would mean the US—the country that has policed the world’s oceans and guaranteed the flow of global commerce since WW2—could no longer guarantee passage through the world’s most important energy corridor.
That would strike at the credibility of American power.
Taking that leverage away from Iran would require much more than bombing missile sites.
The US would need to suppress Iranian missiles and drones across a vast mountainous coastline. It would need to seize and hold territory. And because Iran could launch ballistic missiles from deeper inside the country against oil infrastructure across the Persian Gulf, securing the coastline would not solve the problem.
That points toward the one option Washington wants to avoid: a ground invasion.
Iran presents a much harder target than Iraq or Afghanistan.
Persia has existed as a coherent civilization and geopolitical entity for thousands of years. Mountains form natural defensive barriers across much of the country. Iran covers roughly 1.6 million square kilometers—about 40 times the size of Switzerland.
It also has strategic depth.
Iran can draw support from regional partners and militias, while Russia and China have strong incentives to prevent Washington from installing a US-friendly government in Tehran.
For China, Iran sits along important trade routes and supplies energy. For Russia, Iran provides a partner on its southern flank and an important link through the Caspian region.
Neither country wants Washington to control Tehran.
That means any attempt to conquer Iran could draw more weapons, intelligence, supplies, and other assistance from Russia and China into the conflict.
The US struggled for 20 years in Afghanistan, a far poorer country with fewer resources and weaker military capabilities.
Iran would present a much larger problem.
For argument’s sake, suppose the US did seize Iran’s coastline and islands around Hormuz. Iran could still launch ballistic missiles from the interior against refineries, pipelines, ports, desalination plants, and other infrastructure across the Gulf.
The US might reopen the Strait only to find that Iran had destroyed much of the infrastructure needed to export oil through it, making the reopening moot.
Could Israel and the US Nuke Iran?
Faced with the bleak prospects of a successful ground invasion, the US or Israel could resort to the ultimate weapon: nuclear bombs.
Iran understands that possibility and has spent decades preparing its government and military to survive attacks on its leadership and command structure. The threat of a nuclear strike would also give Tehran an overwhelming incentive to acquire its own nuclear deterrent before its enemies could destroy it.
Russia and China would also have strong incentives to prevent the US or Israel from crossing the nuclear threshold against Iran. They could respond by extending security guarantees, deploying forces, or taking other steps designed to deter an attack.
The danger goes far beyond Iran.
If the US or Israel used nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary, they would shatter a taboo that has held since 1945. Other nuclear powers would have to reconsider the assumptions underlying their own deterrence strategies.
Could Russia conclude that nuclear weapons had become legitimate tools of war in Ukraine or Europe? Could China reach the same conclusion over Taiwan? What would it mean for India and Pakistan?
I discussed this risk on a private call with a former US Army Special Forces veteran who has extensive experience with the region.
His concern was that once one side crosses the nuclear threshold, nobody can guarantee where the escalation ends. Nuclear powers facing the possibility of further strikes could confront a “use it or lose it” calculation over parts of their arsenals.
That is the problem with the idea of a “limited” nuclear war.
The people who start one do not get to decide where it ends.
Using nuclear weapons against Iran in the hope that the conflict would remain contained would amount to rolling the dice with civilization itself.
I do not consider that the base-case scenario. Mutually assured destruction still gives the major nuclear powers enormous incentives to avoid crossing that threshold.
But the possibility matters because the consequences would dwarf every other geopolitical risk.
And even a nuclear attack would not guarantee the outcome Washington or Israel wants.
Iran covers roughly 1.6 million square kilometers—about 40 times the size of Switzerland—with mountain ranges that provide natural protection and strategic depth. A nuclear strike could destroy military installations, command centers, and cities without eliminating every element of the Iranian government or its ability to retaliate.
Any surviving Iranian forces would have powerful incentives to inflict as much damage as possible before losing that capability.
Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona would represent an obvious potential target. Iran could also target the vulnerable infrastructure that keeps the Gulf monarchies functioning: refineries, ports, pipelines, power plants, and desalination facilities.
Even the use of nuclear weapons would not guarantee that the US and Israel could eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten the regional order. Iran could survive with enough military capability to inflict catastrophic damage on Israel and destabilize Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies.
And if those monarchies fall—or conclude that Washington can no longer protect them—the consequences would reach far beyond the battlefield.
The petrodollar system itself could become another casualty.
In that sense, Iran does not need nuclear weapons of its own to possess a form of strategic deterrence. Its ability to threaten the infrastructure underpinning Israel and the Gulf states gives it the potential to produce unconventional consequences with conventional weapons.
That is why I think Iran will retain substantial leverage over Hormuz regardless of how much damage the US and Israel inflict on the country.
And if that happens, the consequences could shake the foundations of the US-led world order.
History gives us a good idea of what such a turning point can look like.
America’s Suez Moment
In 1956, the Suez Crisis exposed a reality that Britain could no longer hide: it remained a major power, but it no longer controlled the world order. In other words, the Suez Crisis revealed that the emperor had no clothes.
Hormuz could play the same role for the US.
If Washington cannot reopen the Strait on its own terms—or must accept a world in which Tehran influences who passes and at what cost—the message to allies and rivals will become hard to ignore.
The world’s leading military power can no longer guarantee commerce through the most important energy corridor on Earth.
Consider the symbolism.
The US Fifth Fleet previously operated from Bahrain, inside the Persian Gulf. If Iran gains enough control over Hormuz to dictate passage through the Strait, the Fifth Fleet itself would operate behind a chokepoint that its principal regional enemy can threaten.
That would mark more than a military setback.
It would represent a massive geopolitical downgrade.
If Hormuz becomes America’s Suez moment, the shock could reach far beyond oil markets. It could threaten the dollar, your investments, and your savings.
I’ve prepared a free report, The Most Dangerous Economic Crisis in 100 Years… the Top 3 Strategies You Need Right Now, to help you understand the risks and prepare. Click here to get your copy.
Tweet
Continue reading...
[ H/T The Burning Platform ]
