On March 7, two young men drove from Pennsylvania to a protest and counterprotest outside Gracie Mansion, the official residence of New York City’s mayor. Federal prosecutors allege that Emir Balat and Ibrahim Kayumi attempted to detonate two explosive devices among the demonstrators. NYPD officers arrested them, and the devices were disarmed before anyone was hurt. Prosecutors say the men were acting in support of the Islamic State group.
The location matters. This was not a battlefield or a distant border. It was a public demonstration outside the mayor’s home — precisely the kind of place where constitutional freedoms and public safety meet, and where police must be able to distinguish one from the other.
Eight months later, on Nov. 16, Mayor Zohran Mamdani and Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch announced that the NYPD would disband its Strategic Response Group. The unit had handled crowd management as well as certain counterterrorism deployments. Mamdani had promised to separate those functions. Now he has delivered on that promise. The harder question is whether the city can deliver on the security that must accompany it.
Under the new plan, the SRG’s counterterrorism functions, including deployments at critical infrastructure, will move to the NYPD’s Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureau. A new 30-officer First Amendment Support Team will focus on communication and de-escalation. A civilian-led Community Dialogue and De-escalation Division will be created in the mayor’s Office of Community Safety, while a new Patrol Support Division will provide crowd-management support. The plan also prohibits kettling, tear gas, and long guns during First Amendment activities. The changes will be implemented without increasing or reducing NYPD headcount.
There is a legitimate case for reform. The NYPD’s response to the 2020 George Floyd protests was criticized in a city Department of Investigation report. It found that the department lacked a strategy tailored to mass demonstrations and often defaulted to disorder-control tactics. A 2023 settlement resolving lawsuits over the response required a tiered approach to protests and prohibited kettling. Those failures should not be excused. Peaceful demonstrators have a constitutional right to assemble without being treated as threats simply because they are part of a crowd.
But a police department cannot protect civil liberties by becoming blind to danger. The question is not whether counterterrorism will remain on the NYPD’s organizational chart. The mayor says it will. The question is whether intelligence, command decisions, and rapid response will remain connected when responsibilities are divided among different units.
The March 7 case makes that question immediate. The investigation involved the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, which includes NYPD investigators and analysts alongside federal, state, and local agencies. This does not prove that the SRG prevented the attack; there is no basis to claim that it did. It does show that a protest can become the setting for a terrorism investigation — and that identifying a threat, sharing intelligence, and responding to it require close coordination.
Nor is the threat confined to one ideology or one foreign adversary. On March 6, a federal jury convicted Asif Merchant, an operative of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, of murder-for-hire and terrorism offenses. Merchant admitted that the Guard sent him to the United States in 2024 to arrange political assassinations. The Justice Department said possible targets included President Donald Trump, then-President Joe Biden, and U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley. Prosecutors said Merchant understood Trump to be the intended target. The plot was disrupted before an attack occurred.
Another Iranian-backed case reached into the president’s family. In May, Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al Saadi, a senior figure in the Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib Hezbollah, was detained while traveling abroad, transferred to U.S. custody and brought to the U.S. The Justice Department has accused him of involvement in nearly 20 attacks and attempted attacks across Europe and the United States. NBC News, citing three sources familiar with the matter, reported that al Saadi had discussed targeting Ivanka Trump. That specific allegation does not appear in the public indictment and should be treated as reported intelligence, not a proven charge. The distinction matters. So does the broader case against an alleged commander accused of directing attacks across several countries.
The threats have also reached Melania and Barron Trump. In July, Tasnim, an Iranian news agency affiliated with the Guard, published a video encouraging violence against the first lady. In August, Iran’s state broadcaster aired another video appearing to threaten Barron Trump. The Secret Service confirmed that it was aware of the video and investigates anything that could be perceived as a threat to its protectees. A threat broadcast by state-linked media is not the same as an operational attack plan. But it is not harmless noise, either.
On Nov. 14, Israel Hayom reported, citing senior Israeli and American officials, that Mossad had passed the CIA intelligence about an alleged Iranian drone plot targeting Trump and senior members of his administration. The report has not been publicly confirmed by the CIA, the White House, or the Israeli government. It must therefore be treated as an unverified intelligence warning, not an established plot. The distinction matters. So does the fact that such a warning was reported at all.
Iran’s use of intermediaries is not theoretical. In October 2025, Polad Omarov and Rafat Amirov were each sentenced to 25 years in prison for their roles in an Iranian government-backed murder-for-hire plot targeting journalist and human rights activist Masih Alinejad in New York. The Justice Department said Tehran used criminal networks to pursue a critic on American soil. A foreign government does not need to send uniformed officers across a border when it can recruit people already operating inside the country.
The same principle applies to influence operations. In July 2024, then-Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said Iranian government actors had posed as activists online, sought to encourage protests over the war in Gaza, and provided financial support to some protesters. Haines was explicit that this did not mean Americans participating in the demonstrations were acting in bad faith. Peaceful protest is a constitutional right. Foreign efforts to manipulate public debate are a separate matter. Both facts can be true at once.
China presents a different version of the challenge. In May, a federal jury convicted Bronx resident Lu Jianwang of acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government in connection with an undeclared overseas police station in Manhattan, and of obstruction of justice. The case showed how a foreign government could use an apparently local presence to monitor and pressure people on American soil.
New York has also faced threats from violent extremists with no connection to Iran or China. Georgian national Michail Chkhikvishvili was sentenced in May to 15 years in prison for soliciting hate crimes and planning a mass-casualty attack in the city. Prosecutors identified him as a leader of an international racially motivated violent extremist group. His case is distinct from the Iranian plots. It is another reminder that threats do not arrive in a single ideological package.
I spent 12 years in Georgia’s security services, including counterintelligence, and later served as a regional military police chief. One lesson from that work is simple: threats rarely arrive neatly labeled. The challenge is not merely deciding which unit owns a problem. It is ensuring that the right people recognize it, share information, and act before an opportunity becomes an attack.
That is why the details of Mamdani’s reorganization matter more than the press conference. Will intelligence gathered during demonstrations reach counterterrorism personnel without delay? Will patrol officers know when a crowd-management situation has become a possible terrorism incident? Who has command authority when a threat crosses the line between protest response and counterterrorism? And will the city publish meaningful measures of response time, information-sharing, and operational effectiveness?
The administration says the new structure will consolidate counterterrorism capabilities and make the department more effective. Commissioner Tisch has said she would not support changes that diminish the NYPD’s ability to protect New Yorkers. Those are welcome assurances. But assurances are not performance measures, and an organizational chart is not an operational test.
A DEMOCRATIC SCHEME TO EXPAND THE WELFARE STATE UNLAWFULLY
Mamdani is entitled to reform a police unit. New Yorkers are entitled to ask whether the replacement structure can do the job. The city does not have to choose between civil liberties and public safety. It has a duty to protect both. Peaceful demonstrators deserve a police department that respects their rights. Residents also deserve one that can recognize a threat in a crowd, connect it to the right investigators, and respond without confusion over who owns the problem.
Terrorists do not read organizational charts. Foreign intelligence services do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. The next attacker will not care that New York has separated two boxes on a diagram. When the next threat appears, the city will not be judged by how neatly it drew that chart. It will be judged by whether its people recognized the danger and acted in time.
Emzari Gelashvili is a San Francisco-based geopolitical analyst and columnist who monitors Russian-language media. From 1996 to 2008, he held senior positions in Georgia’s Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, with a counterintelligence career focused on Russian and Iranian intelligence operations. He later served as a regional military police chief and was a member of Georgia’s Parliament from 2008 to 2012. His work has appeared in The Washington Examiner, Newsweek, The Hill, RealClearDefense, RealClearWorld, and other publications.
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[ H/T Washington Examiner ]