Ron Paul's 2001 Alternative: What Could Have Been
Authored by Joshua Mawhorter via Mises Institute,
"Should we just have done nothing?!" The former question is a common incensed objection whenever someone dares to question the wisdom, appropriateness, or success of the War on Terror. Part of this is because many hold to an unrealistic and idealized "War on Terror" - which was just and, despite mistakes, imperfectly accomplished most or all its stated objectives - instead of the historical War on Terror. Even recognizing significant missteps and disasters of the War on Terror, many defenders would have us believe that - as bad as it was - there was no viable alternative.
(Let us also note that Obama, Trump, Biden, and Trump again all enjoyed electoral success while campaigning, to varying degrees, against the War on Terror, its consequences, or America's prolonged foreign interventions - even as their subsequent policies often contradicted their campaign rhetoric. Yet, despite repeated promises to learn the lessons of these wars, interventionist policies persisted, while some political leaders and commentators even sought to rehabilitate the War on Terror's reputation or even recast renewed military intervention as entirely consistent with the promises on which they had campaigned.)
All that reviewed, what many do not know or remember was that, 25 years ago - in the fall and winter 2001 - Ron Paul proposed an alternative response to 9/11 that deserves serious recognition.
While a staunch non-interventionist in foreign policy, Ron Paul did not suggest that the United States do nothing in response to 9/11. Even as Paul recognized the relevant foreign policy and geopolitical history that contributed to the attacks, he proposed a targeted response against those responsible rather than an expansive, indefinite, global War on Terror. Specifically, Paul introduced legislation authorizing Congress to exercise its little-known power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." This would have authorized the president to commission appropriate parties to capture Osama bin Laden, members of al Qaeda, and others responsible for the September 11 attacks, as well as seize their property.
Paul's proposal also authorized the president to use a portion of the $40 billion already appropriated by Congress in response to the attacks to establish a bounty for bin Laden's capture. By placing the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal under presidential authority, the legislation sought to coordinate these efforts with the administration's broader pursuit of the perpetrators.
Rather than pursuing an open-ended military campaign against terrorism around the world - a campaign that would eventually involve destabilizing governments and countries that had nothing to do with 9/11, and even supporting armed groups with ties to al Qaeda - Paul's approach emphasized identifying and apprehending those directly responsible for 9/11 while avoiding the widespread destruction, civilian casualties, and additional hostility that a broader war in the Middle East risked producing.
To these ends, Ron Paul proposed two bills on October 10, 2001. The first was H.R. 3074 - Air Piracy Reprisal and Capture Act of 2001 which proposed expanding federal piracy law to cover aircraft hijacking and authorizing letters of marque and reprisal against air piracy. The second was H.R. 3076 - September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001 which proposed authorizing the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal against Osama bin Laden and others responsible for September 11.
While we always have to be careful with speculative history, it is also important to avoid status quo bias and fall into historical determinism. As we have a quarter century of data on how the War on Terror unfolded, Ron Paul's 2001 alternative not only deserves retrospective examination but also has aged well in light of history.
On September 14, 2001 - mere days after 9/11 - Ron Paul argued,
About a month later, on October 10, 2001, Paul similarly stated, in a lengthier statement,
He continued,
On October 25, 2001, after the bombing of Afghanistan had already begun, Ron Paul reiterated,
Among this prescient wisdom, Ron Paul also noted, "Our widespread efforts of peacekeeping and nation-building will only contribute to the resentment that drives the fanatics." In the midst of his 2007-2008 educational campaign for the Republican nomination, Ron Paul wrote or compiled The Revolution: A Manifesto. In it he wrote (pp. 15, 17),
Ironically, Thomas Jefferson's war against the Barbary pirates is frequently invoked to justify expansive presidential war powers and portrayed as an early American war against Islamic terrorism. Yet Ron Paul's proposed response to September 11 bore a much closer resemblance to Jefferson's limited military campaign than the global War on Terror that followed. Rather than authorizing an indefinite war against terrorism, Paul's proposal would have employed the Constitution's provision for letters of marque and reprisal to pursue the specific perpetrators of the attacks. Indeed, Congress had similarly authorized privately-armed vessels to participate in hostilities against Tripoli in 1802. The historical precedent so often invoked to justify expansive military intervention thus provides an instructive comparison with the alternative Paul proposed in 2001.
The Afghanistan campaign (that ultimately lasted twenty years) was only part of the global War on Terror, but December 2001 in Afghanistan serves as a pivotal decision point. During this period - between September and December of 2001 - there was the growing distraction of ready-made plans for regime-change wars with several other countries (Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran) that had nothing to do with 9/11.
When the National Security Council met at the White House on September 25, 2001, before the bombing of Afghanistan began, President Bush was recorded as saying (p. 133), "We can't define success or failure in terms of capturing UBL." Rumsfeld agreed and suggested (p. 136), "Look, as part of the war on terrorism, should we be getting something going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so that success or failure and progress isn't measured just by Afghanistan?" Bob Woodward records (p. 47),
The policy focus of hiring warlords to fight the Taliban and pursue regime-change and nation-building, plus the failure to provide requested support, narrowly allowed bin Laden to escape into Pakistan - with the help of certain US-paid warlords - in December 2001. In other words, Osama bin Laden presumably could have been captured or killed by Christmas of 2001 if not for these distractions and if Ron Paul's strategy or something similar had been pursued. While that may have not been the end of the matter, there may never have been a War on Terror, along with all its terrible costs.
A November 2009 majority staff report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today, concluded that bin Laden was present in the Tora Bora region in December 2001, American forces had an opportunity to capture or kill him, the failure to block escape routes toward Pakistan contributed to his escape, and a different deployment of American troops and special operations forces might have prevented it.
Instead of taking responsibility for the blatant national security failures - for which taxpayers are charged billions of dollars for "national security" - and being upfront with the American people about the known realities of the foreign policy blowback, US political elites largely blamed Americans for being too free. Their answer was to further restrict liberty and increase inflation and debt at home and pursue more foreign policy intervention abroad, even if it had nothing to do with 9/11.
Instead of focusing on capturing and/or killing bin Laden and those responsible, which might have been possible by Christmas of 2001, both the Bush administration and subsequent administrations chose to focus on a costly, decades-long so-called War on Terror. (It is also important to remember that one of the ongoing strategies in this War on Terror in fact involved supporting the funding and arming of Islamic radicals, related to al Qaeda and affiliates).
While we cannot guarantee the success of Ron Paul's suggested alternative, we know a good deal of the costs and consequences of the War on Terror. A fair evaluation is not to compare Ron Paul's strategy against absolute, non-existent perfection - the Nirvana fallacy - or to assume the alternative to the War on Terror was nothing, but to compare his strategy against what actually happened. More importantly, we should inform and remind people that an untried alternative did exist and was rejected in favor of the War on Terror.
We publish a variety of perspectives. Nothing written here is to be construed as representing the views of ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden Sat, 10/31/2026 - 22:30
Continue reading...
[ H/T ZeroHedge ]
Authored by Joshua Mawhorter via Mises Institute,
"Should we just have done nothing?!" The former question is a common incensed objection whenever someone dares to question the wisdom, appropriateness, or success of the War on Terror. Part of this is because many hold to an unrealistic and idealized "War on Terror" - which was just and, despite mistakes, imperfectly accomplished most or all its stated objectives - instead of the historical War on Terror. Even recognizing significant missteps and disasters of the War on Terror, many defenders would have us believe that - as bad as it was - there was no viable alternative.
(Let us also note that Obama, Trump, Biden, and Trump again all enjoyed electoral success while campaigning, to varying degrees, against the War on Terror, its consequences, or America's prolonged foreign interventions - even as their subsequent policies often contradicted their campaign rhetoric. Yet, despite repeated promises to learn the lessons of these wars, interventionist policies persisted, while some political leaders and commentators even sought to rehabilitate the War on Terror's reputation or even recast renewed military intervention as entirely consistent with the promises on which they had campaigned.)
All that reviewed, what many do not know or remember was that, 25 years ago - in the fall and winter 2001 - Ron Paul proposed an alternative response to 9/11 that deserves serious recognition.
While a staunch non-interventionist in foreign policy, Ron Paul did not suggest that the United States do nothing in response to 9/11. Even as Paul recognized the relevant foreign policy and geopolitical history that contributed to the attacks, he proposed a targeted response against those responsible rather than an expansive, indefinite, global War on Terror. Specifically, Paul introduced legislation authorizing Congress to exercise its little-known power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." This would have authorized the president to commission appropriate parties to capture Osama bin Laden, members of al Qaeda, and others responsible for the September 11 attacks, as well as seize their property.
Paul's proposal also authorized the president to use a portion of the $40 billion already appropriated by Congress in response to the attacks to establish a bounty for bin Laden's capture. By placing the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal under presidential authority, the legislation sought to coordinate these efforts with the administration's broader pursuit of the perpetrators.
Rather than pursuing an open-ended military campaign against terrorism around the world - a campaign that would eventually involve destabilizing governments and countries that had nothing to do with 9/11, and even supporting armed groups with ties to al Qaeda - Paul's approach emphasized identifying and apprehending those directly responsible for 9/11 while avoiding the widespread destruction, civilian casualties, and additional hostility that a broader war in the Middle East risked producing.
To these ends, Ron Paul proposed two bills on October 10, 2001. The first was H.R. 3074 - Air Piracy Reprisal and Capture Act of 2001 which proposed expanding federal piracy law to cover aircraft hijacking and authorizing letters of marque and reprisal against air piracy. The second was H.R. 3076 - September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001 which proposed authorizing the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal against Osama bin Laden and others responsible for September 11.
Ron Paul's Alternative in His Words
While we always have to be careful with speculative history, it is also important to avoid status quo bias and fall into historical determinism. As we have a quarter century of data on how the War on Terror unfolded, Ron Paul's 2001 alternative not only deserves retrospective examination but also has aged well in light of history.
On September 14, 2001 - mere days after 9/11 - Ron Paul argued,
About a month later, on October 10, 2001, Paul similarly stated, in a lengthier statement,
He continued,
On October 25, 2001, after the bombing of Afghanistan had already begun, Ron Paul reiterated,
Among this prescient wisdom, Ron Paul also noted, "Our widespread efforts of peacekeeping and nation-building will only contribute to the resentment that drives the fanatics." In the midst of his 2007-2008 educational campaign for the Republican nomination, Ron Paul wrote or compiled The Revolution: A Manifesto. In it he wrote (pp. 15, 17),
Ironically, Thomas Jefferson's war against the Barbary pirates is frequently invoked to justify expansive presidential war powers and portrayed as an early American war against Islamic terrorism. Yet Ron Paul's proposed response to September 11 bore a much closer resemblance to Jefferson's limited military campaign than the global War on Terror that followed. Rather than authorizing an indefinite war against terrorism, Paul's proposal would have employed the Constitution's provision for letters of marque and reprisal to pursue the specific perpetrators of the attacks. Indeed, Congress had similarly authorized privately-armed vessels to participate in hostilities against Tripoli in 1802. The historical precedent so often invoked to justify expansive military intervention thus provides an instructive comparison with the alternative Paul proposed in 2001.
Bin Laden's Escape and the 25-Year War on Terror
The Afghanistan campaign (that ultimately lasted twenty years) was only part of the global War on Terror, but December 2001 in Afghanistan serves as a pivotal decision point. During this period - between September and December of 2001 - there was the growing distraction of ready-made plans for regime-change wars with several other countries (Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran) that had nothing to do with 9/11.
When the National Security Council met at the White House on September 25, 2001, before the bombing of Afghanistan began, President Bush was recorded as saying (p. 133), "We can't define success or failure in terms of capturing UBL." Rumsfeld agreed and suggested (p. 136), "Look, as part of the war on terrorism, should we be getting something going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so that success or failure and progress isn't measured just by Afghanistan?" Bob Woodward records (p. 47),
The policy focus of hiring warlords to fight the Taliban and pursue regime-change and nation-building, plus the failure to provide requested support, narrowly allowed bin Laden to escape into Pakistan - with the help of certain US-paid warlords - in December 2001. In other words, Osama bin Laden presumably could have been captured or killed by Christmas of 2001 if not for these distractions and if Ron Paul's strategy or something similar had been pursued. While that may have not been the end of the matter, there may never have been a War on Terror, along with all its terrible costs.
A November 2009 majority staff report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today, concluded that bin Laden was present in the Tora Bora region in December 2001, American forces had an opportunity to capture or kill him, the failure to block escape routes toward Pakistan contributed to his escape, and a different deployment of American troops and special operations forces might have prevented it.
What Was and What Could Have Been
Instead of taking responsibility for the blatant national security failures - for which taxpayers are charged billions of dollars for "national security" - and being upfront with the American people about the known realities of the foreign policy blowback, US political elites largely blamed Americans for being too free. Their answer was to further restrict liberty and increase inflation and debt at home and pursue more foreign policy intervention abroad, even if it had nothing to do with 9/11.
Instead of focusing on capturing and/or killing bin Laden and those responsible, which might have been possible by Christmas of 2001, both the Bush administration and subsequent administrations chose to focus on a costly, decades-long so-called War on Terror. (It is also important to remember that one of the ongoing strategies in this War on Terror in fact involved supporting the funding and arming of Islamic radicals, related to al Qaeda and affiliates).
While we cannot guarantee the success of Ron Paul's suggested alternative, we know a good deal of the costs and consequences of the War on Terror. A fair evaluation is not to compare Ron Paul's strategy against absolute, non-existent perfection - the Nirvana fallacy - or to assume the alternative to the War on Terror was nothing, but to compare his strategy against what actually happened. More importantly, we should inform and remind people that an untried alternative did exist and was rejected in favor of the War on Terror.
We publish a variety of perspectives. Nothing written here is to be construed as representing the views of ZeroHedge.
Tyler Durden Sat, 10/31/2026 - 22:30
Continue reading...
[ H/T ZeroHedge ]
